cost disadvantaged and the independents go out of business when they are faced with increased costs equal to twice the cost disadvantage of the monopolist, it may be possible that the cost-disadvantaged monopolist will prefer not to increase the costs of its downstream rivals.
This exceptional case arises only when the monopolist is severely costdisadvantaged, as I prove below. It can only occur if, when the independents are faced with discriminatorily increased costs equal to twice the cost disadvantage of * the monopolist, they close down. This means that, at r 5 2x, q (x, 2x) , 0, where i * q (x, r) is the equilibrium production level of an independent firm when the i monopolist's cost disadvantage is x and the monopolist increases the costs of its 1 rivals by r, as given by Eq. (24) in Economides (1998) monopoly price precipitated by the existence and production of independent firms in the benchmark case. The second brackets is a proportionality factor that ranges from 1 to 0.41 as the number of downstream competitors ranges from 1 to 10 and asymptotes to 1 / 3 from above as n →~. Thus, for even the possibility to exist for non-price discrimination to be undesirable to the monopolist, the monopolist must be very severely disadvantaged with a cost disadvantage of at least 33% of the price decrease below monopoly price precipitated by the existence of independents. For a low number of independents, this cost disadvantage of the monopolist needs to be at significantly higher levels, for example, at least 50% for five competitors and 100% for two competitors of the price decrease below the 2 monopoly price precipitated by the existence of independents. Such very significant cost disadvantages are very unlikely in the telecommunications where the technology is well known. Even if the monopolist is very cost disadvantaged and the independents go out of business when they are faced with increased costs equal to twice the cost disadvantage of the monopolist, the monopolist may still be better off by driving the independents out of business by raising their costs. This is because the 1 The presentation here is for zero fixed costs. If the independents have positive fixed costs, they can be foreclosed more easily while their production is positive.
2 In Bergman's example, the cost disadvantage of the monopolist is 300% of the price decrease below monopoly price precipitated by the existence of independents: x5s50. 1, a5b51, c50.2, * w50.5, n52, so i condition that the independents do not go out of business when they are faced with increased costs equal to twice the cost disadvantage of the monopolist is sufficient but not necessary for a positive incentive to raise rivals costs. This condition is based on an assumption that the number of competitors remains the same as rivals' costs are increased. But, once rivals are foreclosed, the number of active firms falls to one, and the monopolist's profits increase over and above those used in the above comparison, thereby allowing for an additional incentive to raise the costs of rivals.
